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ANALYSIS: 
Chapter :I.--
.An Histonical Sketch of - Pragmatism _as a Philoaophy: - -
, 1./Some -autbonities , such •as the .Edinburgh Re~iew , ho1~ that 
pragmatism .is .really .new. Most pragmatists on the .contrary 
·hold, .\'l;i.th James, that pragmatism . is .a .new .name for some 
old ways 9f thinking • 
2./As a philosophy .beaning the defini~ e o~ pra~rn atism . it 1\ .. 15 
agreed that pragmatism had its o~igin . iij a series of 
:Arti c le s .in the Popular science ~Aonthl;y :in 18'7.8, by ChaJ;!les 
P.ierce •. In 1898 Professor James dn an a. ddress at the .University 
of . Cal,fonnia b r ought forth again :both the method ·and the 
~gmatisTn , and employed , it _in . a discussion of 
religion . Si~ce then many hav.e wr itten ·and . spoken ·the words 
and .ideas of pragmatis m. 
Just here the pragmatism of James, Schiller and .Dewey 
may be -distingui shed .with a v.iew to true perspective and 
, to afford proper :understandi ng of metes and . bounda~ies . in 
pragmatic theory. Pragmatism . i s 'radical cempirioism', . a 
psychological method, with James; a personalism~ . intentionally 
ethic al and affo~ding speculative sanction to .religio n , .. with 
Schiller; ·and a theory of tbe clog ic of thought as groRing 
out of . expe n ie nce, ·and as . instrumental for further ~ expenience, 
.with .Dewey. 
Among the many who have wnitten . in this field Professor 
Bawden, .in . "The Principles of Pragmatism~, has given an 
exposition wbich . is peculiarly open to cbject~on as being 
based .t1pon 
Ohapter . II:..;._ 
thoro ugh ly unsound philosophical presuppositions. 
.An Examination of the Pragmatism of Professor William . James:--
1 . /Profe ssor . James .is to be 'regarded as the Eead Master of 
.modenn pragmatism. 
2 ./As to temper ament and one's philosoph~rJames ·holds that men 
are determined ~ in their philosophical position by tempera mental 
.reaso n s .: lar ge ly . Ee offeDs .. ~pragmatism as a philosophy that 
.can .satisfy" oath the . "tough...:.minded" and . the . "tender ... minded'; , 
the empinicist and t~e rationalist. 
-3./J;.s to the ·meaning of' pra.gJ!!a:tism,£irst of .. all., . it do!',)s .not 
represent any speci ?; l r.esults; ,it . is theoneu.:ica.Jlly only a 
met bod • 
. '4. /Pragma:tism .is set ·fortb as a theory of tr.uth •. It .is both 
. a method and also a theory of tbe gene~ation o f •tr.uth . 
• 
• 
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James holds tbat tnuth .and .cea1ity .ane .in :constant mutation. 
~his .is quite '1ike .tte ~iew of -Bergson • 
. 5./The . pragmatic epistemology Jis made :by James to be · ~~adical 
.empir.icism' .• For James .even . the .categor.ies .·are ·held to . be 
generated., :discover:ed ways of gett:ing on, the outcome of 
Ja •long ,course of •histonic •and pnehiston~c practice, that 
:is, .expenience. 
6~/Much of our ;current pragmatism.is based .upon .. (a) a doubt 
of t>he •existence of ,unitary and .identical . thinking persons 
and . (b) ·a p1m'alistic metaphysics •. If pra.gmat. .ic theory :can 
. ' ' ' 
be once ·allied with sound philosophical presuppositions 
then dt .is believed .it may be :useful as an epistemological 
philosopp;y. 
Chapter· .III.--
An exposition of . the -higher pragmatism . as the determination 
of t.nuth-values b;y the pl~aetical test of •life experience,..:.-
witb special reference to the evaluation of .neligion. 
1;/The ·higher pragmatism is charactenized by its alliance 
wit h .. certain ratiorn l presuppositions ol.J.pon . whic h alone 
~ny epistemological tbeory can be solidly based • 
. :2. /It .. is heJ.d tbat tbe · co..,..efficient of tnuth-values .is not 
. alone sensa-tional, h1,.1t .also rational, . logical, .ethical, 
and aesthetic • 
. 3./According to the pragmatism based . upon . empi~icism tnuth is 
empi~ioally ~~Q~. This . empinical pragmatism regards .nothing 
as a pr~ioni, .not even the categories of the tunderstanding. 
But for the higher pragmatism these categories are .not the 
products of .expenierJCe ·hut .. ra-ther· the a pnior.i conditions 
of experience . . They are . the rational presuppositions 
.necessary ·to -lift . individual human thinking above the 
plane . of purely subjective :and . solipsistic relativity. 
4 ./Its basis . upon . these rational presuppositions . being once 
given, · then ·the higber pragmatism ; may be formulated . in . the 
wor·ds of the Great Teacher . as follows, ""b y . their fr<uits 
ye sba1l · ~now them~ . 
Finally, let the higher pragmatism be .considered with special 
reference ·to .its .use in the ·evaluation . of religion . 
1.· /Religion is regarded ·as prdmariJ.y an . a pr.iori ar-d . or.iginal 
.ir-art.iculate sense of . somethin g that transcends ,us, together 
with an .u n defiined feeling of cur dependence ~ upon the . same • 
. As such .it .is, of _course, nothing for articulate . knowledge. 
• 
2./In the . determination of . knowledge tfn •religion ·there ·are 
~ involved .cer·tain factors, only part of , which : are ·recognized 
.by the lowe~, or Jamesonian pragms~ism • . The -higher pragmatism 
seeks to . take Jdue account of ;all the ·factors ; involved tin 
the evaluation of ·the data . of religion. 
3. /.As _ apr·opos . to _ this phase of . the subject, 1:j.t has to be re-
called that the fact that hnowledge :£§_g:hn~ · with .exper.ience 
_:does ,not 1imply _ that Lit _ tberefore ;- oni_g.!_~~£~ . in exper:ience • 
4~/The problem of · the ph~losophy of re 1 igion :is found J ~n the 
.:evaluation of or •±11 the .deterrninatio.n of : the hnowledge of 
the various expresf,>ions of · the religiQ.us ,nat)lre .· among men, 
·and t ·he . factors :involved ; in . t h~s work · are ;. ( 1) . t be -rational 
or - theoretical, ·and . (2) the pragma tic. 
5./The higher pragrnat~sm is distinguished from the . lower 
pragmat ism by it s recogn i tion of ratiopal acd volitiopa1ly 
accepte d presuppositions. There :is . no pragmatism, that has 
any night to rational standing, that is not -based . upon 
rational .and volitiona lly accepted presuppositions • . Even 
. pragmatism, . therefore, . must ·be : tested .. in the , supreme .court 
of the ·reason • 
. 6;/It cis found that . as .distinctly supplementary to tbe theoretic 
. and scientific truth-principle, there -is - also the principle 
of value, which . is of p r agmatic . use in the determi na tion 
. of - the knowledge of the reli gious ! life and _nature among men . 
? . /T he original and a priori elements of · t he human personality 
rare not .established by theoretic "proofs", but rather by · a 
pra,gmatism which _is :itself . based 1upon · ratio na l and . volit.ion-
ally . accepted presuppositions • 
. 8.; /It ;is therefore -a ·conviction of . tbe present .. •wr:Iter -that this 
. oenere.tion can · learn .no Inore ; important , les'son than bhis of 
0 . 
. the rationally based . and practica1ly . estab1isbed pninaiples 
of the hi g her pragmatism, . as we have conce~ved ~ it, to the 
determination of truth-values, both for the . indi~ idual 
· and for society, and none · tbe -less for locating the t~ue 
gro~nd of :certainties in po litics and ethics than . in 
reli g ion. 
Chapi;. er ,IV •' --
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Chapter ,I.--
An Hi s torical Sketch of Prag~atism as a Philpsophy. 
,tf.tt#tltif 
There !is much difference . of opinio :r:: as · to tbe time . which 
: should be a~signed for the beginni ng of pragmatism a s a philosophy . 
Mo st pragmatists hold that · the modenn · doot~ine of pragmatism 
.is not really .new but . tb.at .it . is . mer-ely ·a n~w statement of 
ancient ·relativisn; . . In the bibliograph~.' ap pended to . this tbesi s 
will be cit ed an article b y Profe ssor .Boodin, entitled, . "From 
Protagoras to James "(T he Monist, Januar~, 19111, in which the 
"V.iew .i s presented that the pr.ag me.t.i srr. of ·James . and ot b.e rs . li}:e 
him .is , re al l y only a modenn putting o f the Prot agorean philosophy . 
Professor Jan:es . calls . his book, . 11 Fr agn;ati sm: .A .Nei'i . l\ame for 
Some Old .Ways o~ Thinking~. On the other hand, some authonities , 
such .: as the .. Edinburgh Rev,iev; -{.Apnil, 1909)_, , tak.e tbe position 
that pragmatism . i s really . new • 
. It is significant that Prctagoras sho uld have a sserted: 
. ~Man ~ is the measuce of all things; of thing s that are, tbat 
-they · are ; of things that ar e , net, that the~r are not':. 
Protag oras .was a t ho ro ugh - g oing relativist . Concerning ·tbe 
. exi stence of the gods he was. ucc~rt ain . Ee said , " With regard 
to the godE . I kn o w Eot whethe r · the~r e :~ist or .not, or what they 
·ar:e like. Mar::y t t ings prevent our . knov1ing; the sub,ject ,is 
ob scur e ·and brief .is the E;pe.r; of our mortal .life"(Eus. P. E •. , 
XIV •. , 3 ,- '7 . -- . Cit ed . in Ba kewe ll's S ource Book in .Ancient . Philosopby, 
p • 6 7 ) • Jam e s s a y s , . " I p e r s o n a: 1 l y g i v e . up t be . A b s o lu t e · ~ ( P J;' a g-
mat ism, p . '78) . Be deola.r es a lso,. "Ther e is absolutely .nothing 
.new .in the pragmat ic ~eth od . Socrates was •an · adept at . it • 
. Aristotle used . it methodicallJ' • . Loc k e, ·Eer l,e ley, ·and Burne 
'made . momentous . contnibut io11s to tr:ut b . bJr 'its means'! ( P:r a.gma,tisrr:T 59) . 
Goethe >vrote,, '~I have observed that :.I hold ·t h at thought tc , be 
' :!!:£~~whic h ,is~!!.fEl ·f.Q.£. ni e, . which adjustls ' itseJ:f to the 
general d±rect.io n of · my thought, · and at the san:;e time furthers 
. me , in . it • . Now it is .. not only pos s ible , but ,nat.ura1 , that such e. 
thought should ,not .chime i n wit~ the sense of another · person , 
;nor -further ·him, perhaps ·even be a hinder a nce ·to b~m, . and ·. so 
be .w±ll.hold .;it . to be fal se ; .. when o ne ,, i s r.ight . tboroughl;y 
. . . ' . -. 
. corn~ inced of this be . will .never , indul g e . in coniincbversy~' (quoted 
. by . Euber~reg, Eist. of Ph:iJl.. ;Vol.. I ; ?5). : E uber\~e g ; also g.uotes 
Goethe !s :words frorn · M.i!2...!!!2~ - .b!E.£ :. g~f1~~io}2~.£ > "- When : I know 
n:;y relation to myself ar:d to the . out er world, . I :;>a.y ,- that . I 
• 
• 
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possess the ·tnutb. "And ,- thus . each ·may ·have ·his own ·tnutb, .·and 
yet . tnutb . is ever the ·same!!. 
~he history of . the doctnine of :relativism, and the •long :and 
var.ious . insistence upon tr.uth .· as .. consisting .in ·the :meaning .·for 
the knower . of .· that ·.which .: is .knovm .will, . I think, .ju~;~t.ify the 
· ~iew . of . pragmat ± sm as :a .new . name for som~ old :ways of , thinki ng . 
~And so 'much . may be :said :without . expreesing : any . judgment ,upon 
~ the · vali~ity of prag~~tisro~ .wbetter .pew or ol d • 
. As · a philosophy :bearing . the . deflinite f orm of pragmatism it 
. is agreed t ha t prageatism had . its origin in : a . se~ies of Articles 
.in the Popular S cie mce Monthl y .in 18?8, by . Cbarles Pierce. 
Pierce ·took ·tbe positio n that t h i nk ing has ·for .its purpose the 
-resol ut io n of . doubt ~ and the f ~ xing of .belief • . And ·when we :co me 
·to the deter mi nation of , t be . real as meaning, Pierce held that 
~th~ne :is . no distinct i on o f mean ing · so fine as to consist 
~ in anything but a possible .difference of practice~(Popular 
. S ci. },Ja n .. , Jan •. , 1 878 , p . 293) . Pi erce was writing .upon . the ,logic 
of S?ience, a nd the pr incipl es that he set fo rth are the 
sum : and substance of pra gm atic t heory as . it has been s ince 
. developed . PragmD.tists hold that sensa tions, ., i d> ias , . beli e fs, 
a r e re a ll y for us just what they are fo r _acbi on or . practice . 
, I d ea s wh i ch a r e really . satisfactory for practice ·a re . a lways 
held to b e tnu e . Th o se , i deas . wh ic h are ~ not . · satisfactory for 
practice are, . as .. a co n seguel'loe , ·held to · be ·false. This .. is . the 
. pragmatic · metbod of the eval ua tion of ;ideas, · that : is, ·for ·the 
. ~~terro~natt~n of tcuth. 
Twenty years >later .in 1898 Er0fessor , James .in •an caddress 
·at the .University of Calafpnnia br6ugbt · forth · ag~in . the - method 
. and the pninoiple, and . employed ~ it . in a cdiscussion of •religion. 
. . . 
. The : fulnes s of . t.ime was · then ·· come , · a.nd ·since · then . many ·have 
wnit te n and spoken . the wo r d s and.~deas of . 0 praij~at ism~ • 
. F;C . S . Scbill e r o f Oxf or d wrote h i s wo rk , entitled;" Eu manism: 
Ph:i!J.osop,hical E ss ay s" . in 1903, a.nd the r e appeared by · the ·same 
,author ·: " Studies .in Eumanism" .. in 19 GI7 • .. "Studies ~ in Lo g ical 
Theor~" by Jphn Dene~, and others, wa s pub1isbed : by the 
.University . of .Chicago Pre s s, · also . in 1903. 
With . a view to true perspective and . a proper .understanding 
of pfagmatist ·metes :and boundanies cit . will .be ~ ell to draw 
··a distinctioE . bere . The t e r ms-. " b tunanj.sri·" ; and : " pragrna:tism" 
. and ·- '~i ns tr.urnentalism " ' are often . used . i r. terchang eably, .and 
-they .• ref'er ·es s entia1Jy : t 0 the same . thing . 
• 
? 
Professor -Bawden ·distinguisbes : the .work of . the three most 
prominent pragmatists ·as follows: ."Professor ·James ;emphasizes 
the p~actical ; meaning of philosophy f or . every~day • life, and 
in desonibing his point of view , use s the . words · 'Bragmatism' 
-and 'Radical . Empinioism1 . Mr. Schiller . defends -the nights 
of ,relig ious faith -and 'feeling . in . determining our .: beliefs, 
•and . prefers ·the ·term · 'Huma n ism'.Eis philo s ophy has muoh l in 
. common with .wbat 1in ot her quarters ·has .come ·to be .called 
'Personalism • . Professor ·Dewey .is the :ohampion of ·a scientific 
.empirical : method .in philosop hy. This method is qu ite generally 
knorrn as '. ins tr.ume11talisrn '; , but . i n a recent a rticl e .is descnibed 
by Professor Dewey himself as ~Immediate Empiiicism~ "t The 
Principles of Pra gm atism, p . 9) • . Jam e s is psycho l ogical, ·and his 
. interest .centers : in the establishment of !radica l - empiricism~' 
. He seeks above all :to mak~ philo sophy practical. His . interests 
are :not mystical, ethical or religious; they •are ·rather 
. ep~stemological '_ ;;. no p s ;t cbological i n s o far- as that . is . involved 
_in the . establishing of t he radical empirica l method . His doctrine 
will b e iet ·fcrth at - l ength . in the .next : c hapt er of this thesis • 
. In : "Eumanism :P hilosop tical Essays"Schiller enlarged _upon 
·such · topic s z.s . " Tl:o E:tl:j_ca1 Eas is of l:~ etaphysi cs"; . '" Useless ' 
Kno wled g e'!; . " The Lesire of . I mmorta li t~1" ; a.nd ·. "The Ethi c al Sig-
.nifica nce of Immortality'-' . In the " Studies . i n Humanism" t h e 
autbor considers the ,nature of our fl'BY~dom · and the religious 
: aspects of philosophy . 
Schiller's metaphysical . doctni ne : "cons±sts · essentially _in : the 
position that ·the self or pe~son > is . ultimately real 11 (Biddles of 
the Sphinx=A Study . in the Philosophy of Humanism•~- Reviewed by 
· T~Whittaken ~ Hibbert Journal, .April 1911, p. 6??ff). Schiller 
.is . i nterested .in making a place for the emotional and volition al 
. nature of man. Pe would st an d for fa ith as .a volitional and 
legitimate trust . i n thing s hoped for . . "For a11 we know:, ·the wish 
and . the will to believe m a~ be a factor . i n determining the re a lity" 
. Bawden, p .16) . Humanism i s ethical,mystical, religious, . passional, 
· _volit.ion~l. .And as seen above, , metaphysically .. it .is persoi1a lism. 
Professor John :Dewey has formulated ·an . instnumental or 
. func-tional t beory of -lo g ical t bought • . Ideas : are regarded :as 
. instr:uments _,for .· act.ion. T'0ey o riginate .; in actio n : and they are 
,,• f or .. act io n • .. Vi:i_ t h . Dewey, ;. t ber.ef ore, pra~mat ism ' is ·. ".inst·rume nt ali sm ~ • 
. It is .. logi cal theory . . It ha:3 b een s•:Jt forth . in many articles , : but 
. of . spec~al . i mpor ta rc ce . i s t he . " St udies ,ir' Logical Theory" . cited 
, above . Dewey contcibuted f o ur chapters of that work on . "T houHht 
and ,Its Sub ,ject..,..Matter. !' ~...,.( l)General Problem of ·Logica l . Theory 
• 
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. ( 2) The .Antecedents of 'I!hought, • ( 3) T')le Datum of Th:i!nking · and 
. (4) The ·Content ·a:.nd . Object of ' Thought. ,Dewey !Says . "The ·es 13en-
·tial :business of 1 lo gic ~ ts henceforth -to -discuss,the ·nelation 
of · tbought as . suoh to ;reality as • sucb~(p.5).The main problem 
. of ' lo,gic .is def.ined .· as . "the :relation of : thought· ~ as ·such, 
or .- at , 1 a r g e , · t o . r e a 1 i t y . a s . s u c h, or . at J 1 a r g e '!:( p •. 5 ) • 
• "Bow .:do the specifications . of ·thought . as -- such ·hold good of 
:rea1ity .. as . such? ; ln ·f i ne , . logic : is supposed . to g:r:ow out of 
the .. ep~stemological . inguiry and to , lead ~ up · to _ its s olution ~ (~.6). 
Lotze's . t heory of , 1ogi~, wbich .is the logic of . "pure" · thought, 
.is ~ cD±ticized as being in a::leguate for t!:e so1l.<tion of the 
·logical problem . Lotze . ±s . rep r eeented as defining the business 
of pure •logic : by the Lotzean reference ·to . ''universal forms 
and pr inciples of , thought which ·hold g ood everywhere botb . in 
j ud ging, . of ; reality and . in weighing p oss ib il it y., .· iL'I' ~.fl.E~.:!?:J:Y~ 2£ 
-. £QJL :·· £~ff£~!!.2~ · i.~.E. - :!2..£~ obj~£i§." (Quoted .by Dewey from ·. "Logic"--
Trans .:, Oxfoi'd 1888 • .;.~Vol. , J, pp . 10, 1l •. J:talics . Dewey's) . Over 
·against . such . a ·lo g ic of pure · thought, or thought , in general, 
_is placed tbe . inst~ument al or functional theory o f , thinki ng 
.ill - the ·conci' et e • . :rt . is . held that tr:ue episterr.o.logists know ·that 
· there .: is . no . "tbought, . i n gene ral'~ , - t.bat is, t here .. is ... no thought 
. apart fro m. the .concrete f unctio ning of . i deas Kitbin . and 
const.:i.tutiv e of the thought p rocess. ,Jdeas are ·held to or-iginate 
. in :exper.ience · aed to point forward · to .experience • .: Ideas · a1~e 
.relative ·to their antecedents, ·r and their ~ content ; is determined 
. 'l:> ith . a · view to f.urther act.ion. The content of .:· t ·hought : is deter-
. mined by ·the object . of · tboug bt • . Th9ugbt : does ; D()t ·have ·fornn 
whol•ly .. independent of ; :i. t e oh ~ject~ , rt ds instrumental. 
. Thus pragmatism . is ; radical •ernpir.icism , . a psychological 
method, .with James; . a personalism, .. intentionally . ethical 
and affording specul ~tiv e , sanction to religi on, with Sch~1ler; 
. and a . logic of thought as growing out of experience ·and ·as 
. instr~ umental - for - furt·ber exper.ience, .witl: .DeweJ' • 
.Among the . many . who ·have wr.itten . in this field . Professor 
.Bawden, . i n . "The Principles of Pragmatism'~, has , given .· an exposition 
, which .is peculiarly open to objection ·as being based _upon 
thorough~y . unsound philosophical presuppositions. He pro p oses 
· to - set f?rth,"the . neces~ary assumptions of a phtlosophy , in 
:which . expe1~ience b?comes self.:.conscious · method":, but :in which 
the . division of pbilosophy : into the ory of knowledge and theory 
of .. reality · a re disregarded . Some of· .. us are .not quite . able to 
• 
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see what a philosopby ;would .be : like . ~in . wbich . expeci~noe 
becomes self.conscious method" .without . "a theo~y of . knowledge" 
or .what · tbe ~ ~neoessary : assump~ious" of : such -a philosophy .would 
be .vlithout .a . 1'theory of ·real;it;y'HPreface by .Bawden) . 
~ Bawden denies the .unitary and . identical . character of •tbe . mind • 
.• Nor .would be make any real ·distinction .. between ·the :m:i!nd . and the 
body(p •. 32 ·) • .. After a .caref.ul : readin~ of .Bawden .I. am .unable to 
_un4erstand .what meaning .would , attach to . expenience -as he .conceive s 
;it . ,. '1'/l;!at . i s . e:)Cper.ience which lis .. not he experience of some one? 
Be says ~ ~exper.ience : is . always . in spec;ific . oenters of concrete 
dnter:est . and va1ue", and . ·~w e participate .. in the evolu:b.ion of 
reelity" . etc. Who or what are . ~~~ " . under the author ' s view?(p . 35) . 
~ Bawden has . no use -for an Absolute: . "the ou1y ab s ol ~ te required 
.is ·the concrete process c.f . experienc e . itself"(p ; 39) . 
In his discussion of · experience .Bawden says - "Immediate personal 
·experience..:..- ·. this . is the starting point"(p.51},But ·bow ,can there 
~e personal .. experience without persons? Eow can there be · con-
. sciol,?.sness . wbicb . is .. not t be consoiousness of · some one? Eow .can 
there be meaning which . is .not mean ing for some one? Professor Bawden 
bas based his wor}; . upon , \.msound presup positions , . and his views 
. are vit;at ed by . the ir suicidal ~ i mpl icatio~s. Ee can theorize 
at all onl y by vir ~ ue of the fact tha t . his doc tri nes are not true • 
.. If his doctri nes ~ ith tteir spe c u l a tiv e . i mp lications . were true 
then all thinking, . all experience, . and all knowledge would be 
_impo ssib le. . We wil l now pass to . an e xamination of the pragcati sm 
of Profes so r William James. This will be the subject of the 
next .chapter . 
• 
• 
+ 
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Chapter II.--
. An .Exami1i.ation of · the Pragmatism of Erofessor William James. 
· ttl! iti/:'!Ht!f. t/:!f 
It seems · to many that Professor James was . easily the Bead 
Master ~ in the pragmatist · school ·from ... its or.igin .. until . he ., lay 
down . in ~eatb. Certain . it is that during his Jlater years 
Professor James cont r. ibuted his full sha~e toward · th~ ~ exposition 
. of the . pragmatist theory of . knowledge : and .. also of being. 
Professor . James . oan .not be .understood :by . any one .who does 
. not get his fundamental point of ·view • . For ·him . "tbe ·history of 
philosophy ... is ·to . a great extent · t bat of .. a ·certain . clash · of ·human 
te mperaments~(Pragmatism 6}.He held . that men are determined - in 
their philosophical position , largely . by · temperamental . reasona • 
. Tbe , leaders of human thinking have .. be en tbus .classified • . "Plato, 
Locke, Hegel, Spencer., . are . such temperamental thinkers"(Prag.S) • 
. In philosophical literature we find . men thus distinguished Ainto 
· two great camps, the 'rationalist' . and · 'empiric ist~; ~­
. "~empiricist' meanin~ your -lov er of ·facts . in all tbei~ . crude 
variety, 'rationalist' meanin~ your . devotee to . abstract . and . etecnal 
principles~(Prag.Blwin any criticism tbat . may be . made .upon 
the position of Professor James . it ~ust - not be overlooked ·that 
he explicitly recognizes . that j in ordinary ) life _both facts . and 
principles are . necessary, and, tbenefore, ·the difference .between 
the so~called · rationa1ist . and tbe :empiricist , . as temperamentally 
predet~rmined , is held to _be really only . difference of :emphasis. 
Intelleotualism .. is . synonymous with .ratio na lism . and sensationalism 
. with . empiricism. Ra tion a lism is described as - "always . mQBi§ii2" 
and . empiricism . as .not being . averse to calling .itself Jaluralistio. 
Ari . interesting . idea of Jame s' view of this temperamental 
classification of men is seen . by reference to a parallel column 
: arrangement of c~araoteristics distinguishing the two great, 
. resulting human types. Ee distinguishes . all men . as . "t ende r ~minded" 
or . ''tough.,..minded'! , . as follows: 
. "The ~~nd~£.-,..*i!lli~.9.. Tn~.!~JJ~.h.,.m~.n.Q.~& . Ra'E'ional"lstlc \<?.o1n g .. by _ ~Emplrlcls'E' . ~ golng _ oy . facts) ~ p r i n c i p l e s '· J • • • 
Intellectualistlo .Sensatlooallstlc 
Ide alistic M~terialistic 
Optimistic Pessi~i~tic 
Riligious . Irrell~lous 
~~ee~williet ?ata li~ti9 
Monistic B lural1st~c 
Dogmatical Sceptical ' 
·• ( Pragmatism, 1 2 1. 
• 
• 
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.I do .not think that Green, th 0 Cairds , and Royce would have 
altogether agreed with the descniptibn of their religious 
philosophy as ."pantheistic"(Prag. 17) . James .characteristically 
describes the theis~ic philosophy of hlar~ineau, Bowne and Ladd 
as having ."the air of fighting a slow retreat"(Prag . l8) • 
. A thoro ugh reading of the work of James :leads · me to think that 
he did .not really .under"St and the position of Bowne, Ladd and 
others of ·their way of thinking . Certainly :no one .ev.er :insisted 
.upon the concrete facts of : na~ure more persistently than .did 
Bowne . The .crassest materialistic foLlower of Cemocritus could 
.not regard the .concrete fact-basis of science as more secure 
than d i d .Bowne, as is made .explicit :in all his worlr • . .And yet 
.with theis~ic thinkers of this type .in mind James would say., .in 
setting forth what he called the dilemma in ph ilosophy: " You find 
e mpir icism with inhumanism a cd irreligion; or else you find a 
rationalistic philosophy that . indeed may call itself religious, 
.. but that keeps out of all definite touch with .concrete facts . and 
. joys and sor r-ow s"(Prag . 20 ) • . And again James say s of such theistic 
phtlosoph;y, ."It s t empsramen ~, .if I may .use the word tem perament 
here, . is utterly alien to the temperament of existence .in the 
ccncrete~(Pra g .2 2 ). Such discussion, wh en spread over scores of 
pages, tends to show either a -"temperamental" or a wilful failure 
to .understand Profe s sor Bowne and others ,like . him . 
James offers -"pragmat ism as a philosophy that can satisfy" 
(Prag . 33 ) both the tough- mi nded and the tender - minded, t he empiricist 
and the rationali s t, t h e materialist be lieve r i n co ncrete t hi ngs 
ar:.d the religionist ···rto .i s . ".like a sleep -Yia lker to who m a ctu a l 
things are blank"(quotation fro m Mor ri son .! . Swift , Prag . 32 ). 
As to the mean i ng of pragcatism, fir s t of all , it does not 
represent any special results; it i s theoretically only a me thod . 
James sets i t forth as a way of t ruth - determination in all realms • 
. It is a method of reality evaluation . It makes use of theori es 
and eve n ad so- called "principles~, but it has no place for 
a priori presuppositions . "Theorie s thus b ec o m instrume nts, .not 
answers to enigma s , in vrbich we can r est"-(Prag . 53 ) • . " No particular 
results then, so far, but only .an attitude cf orient a tion, .is 
what th e pragmatic met, hod means . The attitude of -looki ng away 
from fir· s t things, principles, ' categories '., . supposed .neces s ities; 
and of .looking to wards l a st things, fruits, consequences , facts" 
(Pr ag . 54 , 55) . 
• 
• 
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".B:urther:, what .. is pragma.tism .as a theory of tnut•h? .\Yhat . is 
tr.uth? vr ·t · ... ' , .o tb 
.na .1s mean~ wnan . we speax OL e tnuth of .ideas, or 
of . ideas as tr:ue? _nJ·t means . nothing but this, that .. ideas . (which 
themselves are hut parts of our . expenience) become tnue Jjust . in 
so far' as they . help .. us to get, . into satisfactory . nelat .. ion . with 
e ther parts of our . expenience" . (Brag~58). Ideas are tnue as 
instnuments , in so far as they ~work' . 
Pragmatism ;is thus held to .be .not only a method .hut . also 
a genetic theory of tn.uth . Tr:uth .is held to be generaJoed .b;y ea~h 
man, and .is determined . with reference to a1l . ideas .by the . degree 
of sabisfactoriness .with.which they ~work' as parts of our 
. expenience, and, says James, , '\individuals . will emphasize their 
points of satisfaction differently" . (Prag.61). This _is . not .unlike 
the .idea of Gt~the, as alr·eady guoted:."And thus each may have his 
own tnuth~. . If such a theory were to be admitted as . ultimate, 
our .epistemology would . certainly .be . narrowed down to the merest 
solipsism. .It .. is .. not strange, therefore, that G~the, . even though 
somewhat dogmatically , should have added . "and yet truth cis ever 
the same" • James . expli c J tly holds that . not _not only do 'half-
tnuths 1 have to b e ~ade , but that . ~like the half-tftuths, the 
-absolute tr.uth will . have to .be .made , made . as a relation . incidental 
to the . growth of . a mass of veni£ication .expenience, to .whicb the 
balf~tnue . ideas . are all along .contnibuting their quota" . (Pr ag .224l. 
It is held .by James that.rea lity and tnuth are in con s tant 
. mutation. This . is distinctly Bergsonian. This James thinks . is 
_"the most fateful point of difference between . a .rationa list and 
being . a pragmatdst," . (Pra;g •. 226) . i'ie see here ; DO doubt the .:ceason 
.why James thought of himself and .Bergson . as . so closely .kin . in 
their philosophical ~iews. . It ~ is tr.ue according to Heraclitus, 
.Bergson and James that .a11 things flow. Knowledge , is .not thought 
of .by James . as . "a static -relation out of time" .in which a _unitary, 
abiding and . identical knower grasps ·the flowing . sense~manifold 
of .exper.ience .in a timeless form , .bu.t .a11 expenience . is process, 
. and .knower . and known are only conjoined or disjoined terms of 
t -his . expenient.ial process. , It should .be . noted, howe-llen, that .if 
a flowing stream should represent the flowing.expeniences .which 
. ane known , . and . if the .banks should .r.epresent the flowing .knowing-
.exper.iences, then all would .be :flo>"Jing , .. bobh banks and stream, 
·t.bat . is, .bot·h knower and known, and . i·t . is .ev:ident tha t .no ·t 
even the . stream could . ever b e known a s filowing . . If banks and 
• 
• 
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stream really tlow~d togethe~, the fact of £lowing at all could 
never be 'known as' such . Change is a fact of eipe~ience, and 
-something .identical must ·abide across the £lux of change in order 
to know .even change, that ·is, to have the expe~ience of change . 
In the personal experience of ·self-consciousness a lan can 
.change a~d .identity be reconciled, and a provision .be made for 
any adequate theory of knowledge. 
In the work of Professor James the pragmatic epistemology 
.is to be thought of ·as 'radical empir:l.cism ' . James was greatly 
. interested in the establishment of the pragmatic method because he 
.regarded .it as .essential to the establishment of .what he ca11ed 
~ radical . empiricism~. 
He boldly declared that - " ~rue ideas are those that we can 
assimilate, validat e, corroborate, and ve~ify. False .ideas are 
those that .we can not". (The 1Jeaning of Truth,p . vf. ) •. And f.urtber he 
set forth that ."The tr.ue, to · put it very .briefly, is onl y the 
expedient .in the way of our thinking, . just as the r.ight is only the 
expedient . i n tbe way of our behavin~ "( Meaning of Tr.uth,p.vii}~ 
The pragmatic epistemology .is made to be 'radical empiricis~' 
by . the adoption of the p rimary postulate, .which James de£ines as 
follows: . "The only things that shall be debatable among philosophers 
shall .be things definable in terms drawn from experience" • . And 
this .is fo11owed by the declaration . "that the relations between 
things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are .just as much 
matters of d ir ect particular experience, neither more .nor -less 
so, than t he things themselves", and the conclusion is ."that 
therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next 
by relRtions that are themselves parts of exper i ence~( M eaning 
of ~ruth,p.xii). 
If we were to grant to this'radical empiricism' its prim ary 
posiulate (which according to any ordinary theory of .empiricism 
.we coul d .not) , .even then it is .not seen how, _by any philosophic 
procedure known to empiricism, the relations between things 
can ever be experienced as relations, or how relations .between 
parts of experience can themselves ever .be experienced as such 
.relations. Tbe knowled~e of relations .is . not seen to be poseible 
on any theory known to pure empiricism, but o nly through a 
synthet.ic process of thought . James concedes that . "The great 
obstacle to radical empiricism .i n the contemporary mind . is the 
rooted ,rationalist belief tl:at experience as .immedie.tely given 
is all disjunction and no conjunction, and to make o ne wonld 
out of this separateness, a higher .unifying agency must . be there". 
• 
• 
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He ·adds 7 . "In the p:cev?;lent Jidea}:ism ·this . agency . is .r.epr.esented 
~ :;J:s : the .abso1ute . a1l.,;~'litness ; whiab '•r.ela.t.es 1 ,t -b:ings ·together 
.by · throwing · ~ca.tegouies' over ·them . like :a.net. The most peculiar 
. and.unique, perhaps, of !all · these ~oategoniSs i is . supposed : to . be 
·the · tnuub~nelation, ,which .. connects pa:r;-bs of lr!ea1it;y .in . pa.ir._s, 
making of one of ·them la . knoweu, ·and of ·the otber : a thing :known, 
yet ; which ! is ~ itself . content1ess : expenientia1ly" . (Meaning of 
He:ce ~ is an . inter.est.ing ~ notion of ·the oategonies • 
We :would .certainly : admit the ~iew Qf . James ·tha.t :the .categon ies, 
:as 1SUcb, ·a:ce a1l . contentless. llbe:ilr : '.content 1 .comes .- as · the .:cesult; 
of the . constitutive . and . s~nthebio . a,ct of - ~he .knowing .mind • 
. In : tbe view of James ·the :categonies ' are :expenimentally 
generated; ·they .ane discovered :: ways of gettding on. . "Our 
:Bundamanta l .ways of ·thinking .about · things . aue . disco~enies . af 
~ exceedingly 1remote : ancestqns, ;, which · ha~e :been :able ·to pr.esePv.e 
• bhernsel~e s · th:r;-oughout ~ the :expenience of ;all !subsequent : times~(Erag;l?O}. 
The . ~common4sense : cstegonies" : were ~ discover.ed, • veu~flied : and 
: spread : abro~d l in : bhe : oourse . of · histonic ~ and p:cehisto~ic . pnaobice, 
•that : is, .expen±ence ::(Prag.•l82). . :It ·has .:been .•tlhe . '~ounious ; and 
, idle" . intellects, : says James, •that .· have :forf,laken · this ~ common-+sense 
1level ·for · tbe . ~ cn i tioal" ~ level . of ~ tbought . (Prag ~ l85} • 
. I do ~ not be1ieve, · t~erefore, ···t:.-bat t ·he p:cagmat.ist : bbeory . of 
:,know·ledge, :; as · tshus . conceived :by . James, ;, can ' fare : any . better 
. tlhan the oudiriary . emp1nical · tbeory.with . the l inadequacy of ~ which 
:we · have .been ; long ·£am1liar • 
. So ·much, ·for t ·he present, ·for Brofassor ,James' pr.agmai:list 
·theory of ~ knowledge. ':!the pnagma!;tist \·]_Q_Q.!:_ .of 1i:lnuth, ,as .conceived 
·.by •him, . w:111 ·fane · libtle . bette~ • ' If : a1l ~ ideas .which . we .can !not 
. "validate, .cor..robo:cate : and ··IZ'enify" :by ·some process of ond:llnary 
:emp:ilricism :ane ·false, · than . indeed· '·tuue' ddeas :ane ;f ew. "And d :f 
~:t· be ·tnue, ·to put : it ·very .brie:Bly , ~ is qnl~r · t ·he : expedient 1in tte 
way of our ·think i nQ" : and.if we .are conDined · to ·tbe :methods of 
: empinicism · for : bbe . determ~nation of · bbe : exped±en~ , then ~ must 
our proQress · towacd · the . realizat.io~ of ~ the tnue :be Jindeed Jslow • 
. As ·bhus ;stated, pnagmatism : has only ·to.be Jundenstood ; in order 
:to .be ·found . inadequate ·to the ·task Jlaid . upon , it. 
He:ce ·again the fact . needs :emphas±s ·th,t philosophical pce-
; suppositions:count ·for .muah. ·Mpcb of our _cucnent . p:cagmat.±sm 
1is .based :upon 1(a} a doubt of ·the :e»istence of lunitary .and 
: identical thinking persons : and ; (b) ; e plu:calistio :metaphysios • 
. If pragmatic · theory ~ can : be once ~ a1lied . w±bh : sound . ph~losophical 
• 
• 
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pcesuppositious, : then . it J:i:s .believed ·tJhat dt . may :.be _usef:ul :as 
. an . epistemologioal phtlosophy ; in . attain~ng _ a profounder )app!!eheusian 
of :bhat . deg!!ee . of tuuth .reguiaite .for : higbest pensanal 
..: dev<?lopment . 
~Eiust, as · to · the ~ existence of Junitary .and . identical 
persons, dt .. must :be : salid ·t ·bat . James =tneat.s of t ·he ~ existence 
of ;souls, ·· that . is, of pe:cson::::l : ident!it.:~~ , lin · the .empir..ical 
i'ashio-. . Be sa.ys · t ·bat .. "Hume, . and . most ;emp:hni cal psychologists 
. after ·him, : have . denied ·t be ·soul, . sa•xe : as · the ~name for ver.±ili-
able .. cohesions J:hn our . :hnner •life. They . redescend 1into the 
·stream of :exper.ience ~ w: ±t· h . it, . and ~ cash . it . into so much small 
. change value . in the . way of ~ ide as ' and tbe~r peau~iar ~ connexions 
. with :each obher . 
·.As .I said . of .Berkeley':s . matter:., ·the ·soul .lis 
good . or . I t:t!ue I for . ,just. . ~Q ·.!!!ll.£.h, . but _. no more '\ ( Prag. 92 ) . • 
. To all. of which .: it . may . be .. said that _wh:hle ; such . a plu:r;-a1ism of 
;ideas, :exist. ing . only : e: s .•logical : a.b stract ions, , rega:cded : as : enu it ies 
"±ndependent of : and : apart ·from . conm.:ete, ..:. unitar:~~, _abiding _ and 
_identic a l . pel;' sons, ; may ~ be . enough : for ~ empirical . psychology, . even 
_a s ·such tbe;y ; _souJ:d .'Q.§!:.f.Q ; QQ =mean+- ng .except : for : such ~ unitary, 
.ahiding . and . identical persons • The ~ empicical psycbologis t i ca:n 
·talk . of : his · theory of · the ..:. non~e~istence of ~ identioal . persons 
only : by v.iJ?tue of .·t-he .· fact that ; such ·t ,l;leory 1:).s J not · t:oue. 
; No ·theory . even . of . pragma u ic . values . can ·have any valid . meaning 
: apart ·from ·tbe . necessar;y philosophical pcesuppositicn of 
;.unitary, . ab:iding , and ~ iden·t.ical persons . 
- In · trbe . second place · tbe p1uralistic . metaphysics ..:. upan .which 
• uch of our . cuDrent . pragmauism ~ is ~ based , must : Eecaive our 
: attention. Too . of·teo, : as . wi t ·h :. James, pragmatJism , . start :1ng. as 
: a met hod of _ knowledge, : ends ; up . as · a . met a.pbysical · theory . of 
:mubually .. ind ependent · ~bings, ~hat J is , . of - things - which . do : not 
. int era.ct:, _. and to .: 1;\11 of _ which JZEit . other .· l:ihings : may .. he .·. added 
~ w i thout J ::Ln , any .. way .effecb:l.ng the t ·hings tba.t .were(P.rag..,l66.).. 
. But . it does -not ocour : to .J ames •to . a.sk ! how . we . can . know, ~ ~n . a.ny 
c sense . whsteVBDr l t"hat . whiCh l iS . re~~ly . independent ~ and . without . any 
. relation of 1 inteuacbion . wi~h . us. 
· James . advances the ·hypothesis . nthat ~be actual . wonld , 
. instead of .be::1ng . complete ~etenna1ly~, as ~he - monists ;assure 
; ~s , :may _be : etenna :Il ly ·>incomplete,_ a .nd ·. at : all times : suhject · to 
)addition or . liable to . loss~( Frag~l66). He : susta i ns ·b±s ·hypothesis 
_by . urging the fact of our own ~ incompleteness of present 
~ l~nowledge . :It : wou1d ; not _be ; hard · for ~us to agree ~ha t the . wonld 
• 
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.is .incomplete, if that ,is involved .- in our own ·limitat.ion of 
knowledge of the .world. If this .is the Jamesonian phtlosophy 
of co mm on sense, such a phtlosophy may :indeed be common, but 
it can not be exceedin~ly fruitful. 
James thinks this question of the essenti~l . unity or 
plurality of . be in~ is "the ~ ost .central oi a ll philosophic 
problems"(Prag . 129l, an d he is out and out a pluralist. 
My own view of the discussion .i s that James overlooks the fact 
t1HJ.t both . "oneness" ·and .. "manyness " have .no meaning except 
fo r a .unitary , identical and abiding mind . Epistemology can 
avoid solipsism for huma n .intelligence onl y . by a metaphysical 
.reference to a monistic absolute . inte1ligence. For human 
thinking such a monism at the .base of all is the only alternative 
to the collapse of a ll adequate theory of knowledge. 
James' pr agma tic treat ment of - "oneness"(Prag.13 2 ~ is 
not ob j ectionable. But it must be remembered that even prag-
matism can .never do away with the ration a lly .necessary 
a priori presuppositions , wit hout putting .an en ~ to all 
investigatio n, -- even that of pra gm atism itself. It remains 
that the va lidity of every judgme nt depends upon the condition 
cf things exist ing f undamentally i n a system . Side-by-sidedness 
.without any real int e raction so me where i s not enough • 
J a mes says fu~ther: - ~A g ainst this .notion of the unity of 
ori g i n of all thi ngs there has always stood the pluralistic 
.notion of an eternal self-existing many in the shape of atoms 
or eve~ of spiritual units of some sort~(Frag.139) . Such a 
radicall y em pirical pluralist as James may pass by such a 
problem as of -little or .no conseque nce in his phi losophy, 
but it yet remai ns that abso lute causa l unity .is a rational 
presupposition witho u t, wh ich a ll know l edge would a t .least -lose 
its objective snd universal validity • . When more broadly conceived , 
.I would think that such a pr~supposition would .even itself 
have the highest kind of pragmatic value • . All the ob jects 
of objectively and .universally va lid . thin k i ng must . be capable 
of being subsumed u nder such an absolute genenic . unity • 
. Further, as to the f und arrental unity of purpos e involved in 
the conception of the world as . ~ en eri ca lly one, Jam es remarks, 
."t he a p peara ncee. conflict with such a vi ew ". (Pra.g .14:1.) • . I woul d 
add, . by .way of commenta ry, that Ja.rr.es gives .us a good ·stateme:ct 
of . surface appe e.r~.nces, -no doubt, but, .unless we are to be 
satisfied with the s e and ask no basal question, such a view 
makes .no place for rational or .adeguate theory of knowledge, 
and certainly such a view .is too · limited to . leave any place for 
• 
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an adequate theory of being. .And yet .in the evalua~ian of 
;life, and .in .its en~iohment, an .adeguate theory of .knowledge 
.and also of .being .would seem to ha~~ . e~en high pragmatic 
. importance,-- at 1least :when pr.agma~ism 1 is .cightly conveived. 
James hoi~s that ~everything ~akes . strongly for the ~iew 
that our .wonld~s .incompletely .unified teleologica1ly . a~d.is 
still trying to get 1its .unifioatian .better organized~( Prag~I41} • 
. I would rather say that .everything points to thi view merely 
that men are everywhere trying to systematize and organize 
th'e parts and .uses of ·the .wo!!ld for ··t.heir ovzn ·teleological .ends, 
.which .is something very differe11t, : and that this .work of 
scientific mastery . is still going on. This mastery . is attained 
howe~er only .by .intelligent obedience ·to and harmonization .with 
.an order, or .law, which .men find .but do .not make. Man '.s· . invent ions, 
discoveries, systems, are .intelligible, and ha~e rational worJah, 
only by v:irtue of harmony . \vith a .basal ord~r of intelligence,..,.-
.with .which these .works of .men are thus commensurate.~- · 
Caird's .Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, page 22, 
may .be cited as apropos to this phase of the discussion. 
James .declares . it to .be a .risky procedure :in dogmatism to 
.olaim . "absolute teleological .unity, . saying that there .is one 
purpose ·that .every detail of the -universe subserves~(Prag.l42} . 
I do . not, howev:er, see how .it should be so regarded, ~ unless 
.it be to dogmatize . when one assumes presuppositions to which 
one . is rationally shut . up . as .necessary to giv:e o~e~s · thought 
processes . any meaning or philosophical .worth. 
• 
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Chapter .III.;--
.A •l .Exposition of ·t ·he Higher Pragmatism as the 
Determination of T~uth-values . by the Practical Test of Life 
.Expecience,--With Special .Reference to the .Evaluation of 
Religion. 
The opinion bas already .been .expressed Jin this thesis 
that .if pragmatic theory . can .be once allied ;with sound 
philosophical presuppositions, ·then •it .may .be . usef.ul 
as an .epistemological philosopby .in .attaining .a profounder 
apprehension of ·that degree of ·truth requisite for · big~est 
personal development • 
. I have ca11ed the pragmatic theory that may .be thus conceived 
ihe ·higher Eragmat.ism. As setting forth the presuppositions 
.upon whioh .alone the higher pragmat.ism . can ~be solidly .based, 
.I may .be permitted to quote from the Preface to my book, 
. "The Volitional . Element . in Knowledge and .Belief'~, ( Which .is on 
file as collateral . work .in the present course}. :I have there 
said: 
There . is ·.nothing more pressing . in the thought activities 
of our time than the .bringing . into t~ue perspective ~he 
matter of . presupposi~ians . in p hilosophy . and ~eligion. 
The , ~eally . signifi~ant p hilosophical .and religious 
IS.· . . 
thinking of our timeJ\ ~J:. ', . in all oases . whe~e the thinking 
.is consistent, .based . upon t.be . approp:ciate presupposit.ions. 
$ 
; :>!; -:+;:i; 'f:* These presupposition~~,. which . are ·so . determina~ive 
for all our thinking . and for all our . oonclusions . are 
. largely a matter of the .will; that . is, the mental . response 
to the . soul's . en¥ir onment .which these .represent . is practical, 
passional, volitional . 
Philosophical theory . is d e termined .in character 
and . speculat.ive significance by .. its presupposition$ 
t6uohing two questions • .Rirst, .is thinking and .knowing 
. an active process . representing the . self~directed . working 
of a .unitary and abiding .ego, or . is . it~ passive process 
; representing · tbe .reaction .which . something which may .be 
variously . styled .brain, mind, substance or . inner . life makes 
.against something . wbicb may be variously : styled .nerve stimuli, 
sensation or the outer . would? The pbilosophers . of ·this 
generation . see more .clearly than . ev e r .what a .long train 
of .qonseguences for moral and . speculative the ory follow 
• 
• 
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.upon the Elnswet· to this question. ·What ·the anst.,rar sba11 
.be .is, at the first .and .at the :last, with . mo~e or !less 
.: analytical - ~eflection thrown .between, .determ:imed voii-
tionally. The present ~ author balds -it ·as a .rational 
presupposition that thinking and .knowing . ~epresent the 
. self~activity of a .unitary and abiding ego • 
. A- second question, the answer to ~hich .is equally 
. determinative for philosophical theory, .runs ·as follows: 
.Is fundamente.l .being to . be -regarded as .intelligent, free, 
purposive, . self~existent embodiment of the principle 
of efficient . ca~sation, or is , it . non~inte1ligent, non-
purposive, .. non-causal~ . eseent:i, a:1 ly an . unknowing .and 
.unknowable somewhat of wbioh .nothing oan _be affirmed 
and . notbing denied? Upon a thi nker's answer to this 
question .. will depend the trend and outcome of _a11 his 
1.9£.i.92l reasoning in metaphysical theory.Here also .will 
follow .important speculative o o nseque mces touch i ng the 
. problems of thought and .knowledge .and the .bases of 
. ~eligiop. ,It is a. conviction with the author tbat fundamental 
.being can be found . nowher e short of free . intelli~ence, 
. self-..ox i stent, t he const ant a n d .unfailing cr eator ar:d 
.uphoider of .all that . is, the World- ~. round, t be Absolute, 
the Chcistian~s Go d . If some t hing l ~ss than this - is to 
. be . accepted . as rational p r esuppositio n in metaphysical 
tbeor~, nevertheless the author can .not . beg in .with .any 
me taphysical presupposition, touchi ng fund amental . being, 
short of . self..,existent, .causal . i ntelligence ,.if:, .upon -re:Blection, 
he hopes to reach any very valuab le conclusion. 
Th e pr.in1ary acceptance of . such presupposition :is volitional. 
.Afterwards .it .is supported by processes of ana l ytical 
reflection which, other assumptions . being freely made, 
shut our thougbt . up to . aocept . it or . notbing . Then follows 
wi th . the present author its final acc ep ta n c e, which . in 
the .last analysis . is freEl, rational, volitional.. ::+:~":* 
[As rel evant to tbi s phase of our present . inquiry .I 
may cite the .whole of the preface and ~ also the .essay 
.which .bears the title of the .book, ."The Volitional .Element 
in .Knowledge and Belief~} . 
I believe that ae . a protest against the - rigor .and vigor 
cethod of formal logic . in the deter mina tio n of · truth~values, 
or .as an appeal from a .narrow and e xc lusive . inte1lect.ua1ism, 
• 
• 
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to the wide and all-inclusive field of life experience, 
the high§£. pragmatism may have an importa.nt message for our 
generation. It is a le sson much needed to be learned that 
the co-efficient of truth-values in the actual experience 
of men is not alone sensaiional, a s the empiricists would 
teach~ but also rational, logical , ethica l and aesthetic. 
According to the pragmatism which is based upon 
empiricism truth is empirically ~de. Truth is regarded by 
such pragmatism as relative, £1, t l e ast the knowledge of truth 
and reality is relative . Even for the higher pragmatist 
there is, indeed, no pos s ible standard of truth or test of 
knowledge apart fro m and independ e nt of our own thinking . 
Profe s sor· Bowne welJ. says: '' !Every rational being mu st c.t last 
tr ust his rational insi g hi "(Theor y of Thoug ht and Knowled g e, 
278 ). The words of John Caird may be cit ed :"It is possible 
to doubt evfrything i ls ~ save this .ultimate relation of re a lit y 
to t "'cought •. **** W hatever, tberefoPe, has realit~,; must be capable 
of a pproving .itself to consciousness"(Intoduction to the 
Philosophy of Religi an,50) . But the higher pragma~ism ca n 
not accept the proposition which James sets forth as the 
postulate of his 'radica l empiricism', na me J.;y, \\ (; t he.t the 
on ly things that shall b e debatable among philosop hers shall 
be thi ngs definable in terms dr awn from expeDience ! 
Humanism a n d Jameso nian pragmatism make this postulate hold 
even for the categories. This empirica l pr agmatis m regards 
nothing as a priori, not even the cate g ories of the understanding, 
but these are held to be the result s of prehistoric e xperience , 
~long ·ago wrought into the structure of our consciousness and 
practically ±rreversible"(hleaning of Truth, 64) . But for the 
higher pragmatism, upon the other hand, these fundamental 
categ ories are not the -products of experience but rather the 
a priori con d itio ns of experience . They are among the rational 
pre suppositions necessar y to lift ind i~id ua l hu ma n thinking 
above the plane of purel y sub jectiv e a~d solip sistic relativity. 
The higher pragRatism is an a r pe a l from the 'pure rea s on' 
of assumed complete and exclusive l y empirical assimilation, 
validation, corroboration an d verifying of ideas, as the 
measure of their truth, to the ' p ractical reason' whioh was 
formulated a .lo ng time a. go as follo ws: "by their fruits ye 
~.lb. know them. " This, { sou.nd ratio na.l a ssurrptions being 
~c gloe.J, as the only v2. lid basis .upon w1licL to rest any 
,. 
ad~quate theory of trut h and knowledge ) become s the hi g her 
• 
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pragmatic test of true .ideas . Men need ~ver to be reminded 
that truth~vclues belong to tho se ideas which are validated 
and verifierynot, on the one hand, by the te sts of sense 
experience alone, nor, on the other hand, by tbe te s ts of 
for ma l logic and pure intellectualism, but rather by the 
fruits of a normal and expanding ·life. Men have full ri g ht 
to hold that those ideas are true which, appropriate 
1 . . t. $ , . g "'i . f. ' b t h . ~rational presuppos~ ~o~oe~n g ven, are ver~ 2eo y .e~r 
fruits. 
Finally, let the higher pragmatism be considered with 
special reference to it s use in the evaluation of reli g ion . 
It may be premi se d that reli g io n is always and everywhere 
primari ly a.1'1 a. priori and origi na l, und e fined ln,'lo\.e,n sens e 
of something t hat transcend s _us, together with an inarticulate 
fe e l ing of o u r dependence upon the s am~ . Religion i s thus 
one of the great, pr·i rrHn~ ~;, human ·instincts . Of cour s e, relig.ion , 
in t, his a priori char acter , i r:,~ot hi.n g for articu late lmowled§l.e, 
not even as r e l a tive and solipsi s tic • 
In the evaluat ion of th e elements and p rinciple s of all 
knowledfe and b e li ef there are certain factors, only part of 
which are reco gn i zed by t he lower or Ja meso nia n pragmatism . 
The higher p r agmati sm undertakes to t ake ac coun t of all 
these f act or s of the knowledge process in it s ep i stemo logy . 
Rant point e d o ut that know i edf.,e may be>!.i£ with exper::Lence 
even thoug h it does not follow that it .Qrig_im.•"t§ ..§ by exper:ie nce . 
Just so the kn owled g e of religion with all its power to i nv es t 
life w.'.th value for us, that is, the kno!Y.le c1gg of th at wi th 
which .we are origirally endow e d as an undefined s ense of 
something t hat transcends us may J:le!?il; oniy with experience, 
even though · it do es not orig_:j,.!)a tg .by exp erienc e . 
Religion, as undefined a nd a priori, has a universally 
norma l tend ency to express itself in conc e pts, teachi ngs and 
i nstitutions , and these determine the conduct of men as in-
div i dua ls and as members of societ~. The prob l em of the 
philo s o p h y of ·religion is fo und in the evaluat~on of these 
vai i ous exp r ession s of the religious nature among men, and 
the factors involved in thei~ .evaluat io n are 
(1) the r&tio r ~ l or the o retic and 
( ~) the pragmatic~ 
• 
• 
These factors are not to be thought of as mutually in-
dependent, but r athe r do they exist and work together in 
reciprocal relations • . The rationa l or theoretic factor 
includes cognition, feeling, willing,-- that is, all the e lements 
of the whole unitary mind or ego . The pragmatic factor includes 
all the elements of practical life experience s uch as can 
.not be measured by any formal log ic, or any merely conc ep~ua l 
thinking • 
Our present purpose does not ad mit a full consideration 
of the rational factor in the development of the kno~ledge 
.and evaluation of .religi on. '"2d:d our prese nt purpose .contem-
plate so much we would she~ (1 ) how the rational factor 
develop es the orig inal, . inarticulate sense of dependence .upon 
something t hat t ranscends us .into an .intelligible .and articulate 
conviction7 knowled ge or belief . We would show .in the second 
place ( 2 ) how the r at ional factor everywhere and always de~elopes 
a more or less definite symbolism, at the center of which 
. i s the pDinciple and u~e of t he analogy of self . 
But the rational or theoretic factor in the development 
and eva l uat io n of the concepts, teac h ings and institutions of 
religion, is .not the only factor involved • Rel i g ion can not be 
full y accounted for or explained by any lo~ic of pure intellect -
uali sm . In its most original and u nivers a l sense .it defies 
theoretic and scientific explana.tio11. Dr. Har·o1d BoffdiDg, 
therefore, ,in his great work entitled, nTbe P hilosophy of Religion", 
brings the .religious problem everywhere to essential pragmatism 
for solution. Hoffding argues as follows : 
Life has cert ain .needs • That which will satisfy those 
. needs has value, and, so far forth, may be ret ained as true . 
Life has needs which have been satisfied .in the past by 
religion with .it s rra nifoJ.d and various concepts , teach ings 
and institutions . Ther e fore r~ligion has bad value . 
Life still has needs , but th e conditions of their satisfaction 
have changed . J an the needs of humanity under the change d con-
ditions be stil l satisfied by religion with it s changed concepts, 
t eachings and institutions? Can the .concepts, teachings and 
.institutior)s of religio n be so adapted as to meet the .needs of 
.life egually well, or better, than in tbe past? If so, religion 
has conserved its old values under changed conditions. Here , 
Hoffding insists, is our problem. Religion i s oonc~rned not 
so much with intellectual science as with the evaluation of 
The test of religioi1 .in .every age, ·and among all peoples ., 
• 
• 
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. is - its power to have value for ~life, that ~ is, to .. invest 
. life . with value for _u s. Our , way of ; looking _at - ~eligion, 
· the~efore, that -.is, our philosophy of ,: religion, our : estimate 
. of . its tnuth, .. will . depend . always . upon the tested power of 
;:~:•eliE_iion, . by . its . concepts, · teachings . and . instit•utions, to 
: oreate .and conserve Jlife ~alues . The application of this 
. method ~ is . what we mean .by the .use of the pragmatic factor 
~ in the . att a inment of.reli g i o us conv ict ion, knowledge or ~ belief . 
~ urthen , . as with the rational factor in the determination 
. of tnuth . in the fields of . scienoe or religion, so with the 
piagmatio factor, t he character of . the results : must depend 
, largely " upon _. rational ,_ and vel it ionall y . accepted pre suppositions . 
~her:e .is no pragmatism, even, · that h as any .right to ratio na l 
st3nding, that .. is . not based . u p on r ati onal and volitionally 
. accepted presuppositions • . Eve11 pra gma tism, t he1~efore, . must .. be 
tested . in . the supreme court of : reason. 
It follo ws th at there .. is wbat . may . be called a . lower prag-
_matism and . a hi~he r pragmatism . Wbat . I will call the ~ lower 
. pragmatism, of . which the . leading . expositor . was Professor James , 
. is . based · ( 1) _upon a radically empinical postulate, : as 
. already stated, wh ich however (thoug h somewhat .inconsistently) 
. is .itself · vo1itionally predetermined, . and c(2) _upon a recurring 
. doubt concer.nin~ the . existence of .unitary, .. identical . and 
. abiding persons, .; and . (3) .upon . a metaphysical pluralism • . I bav.e 
. already - set forth the , inadequacy of this - lower . pragmatism ;in 
the seco~d chapter.. On the other hand, it . bas already . been 
pointed out - that Hoffding . ever ywher.e . br.ings . the problem of 
the t r uth of religion to the practical test of value-
conservation for solution . The difficulty . witb the work of 
Hoffding . is that be too fa ils properly to . estimate the 
:i mpor tance of the theoretic o r .rational factor ~ in relig io~ • 
. Be denies the validity of scientific explanation - •~hen _ applied 
to religion. _It may, hov1ever., with Professor Ormond, . be .re a-sonably 
. insisted that th e .critical . us e of self~analogy , in the determina -
tion of . knowledge in . religion . is . both valid . a nd . scientific • 
. l>nalogy _must of . cour. se . be cr.i t ically . grounded, _and .. s ymbols 
. and . ~epresentative . concepts must be cnitically .. used. But 
analogy, . w~en thus .used, .is a safe and . scienti£ic p~inoiple for 
the teleological - interpretation of tbe . wonld . and tbe . Won1d.ground, 
. and of the relation . between tbes~. We . are undoubtedly on . s~oure 
footing ._ when we . stan d .upon t be thesis · t bat. analogy .. is .- a 
• 
• 
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principle of real intelligibility in reference to God and 
religion. A nd by the critical use of ·this principle we can 
reach a true, though incomplete, explanatio n of the world, 
of God and of religion. 
But as distinctly supplementary to the theoretic and sci -
entific truth-principle there is also the principle of value 
whic11 .is of pragmatic .use . in the determination of the •religi ous 
nature and life among men . Tbe value-principle has the relation 
to the truth-prin c iple that Kant's Pra;tical Reason holds 
to his Pure Reason. 1\. :s against the -lower., empirica-l ~ragma. tism 
. it i s insisted by the hi g her pragmatism that we .need to know 
the scientific and the oretic truth about a conce p t o~ percept 
of reli g ion .in ord:cr to g ive these any re a lly pragme.tic value. 
The higher pragmatism holds that theoretic ar;d ral onal truth, 
.upo n the one band, and pragmatic value, .upo n the other hand, 
have a reciprocal relation in t he evaluation of religion. 
Tber:e are , the r efore, two motives ·in religion, .namely, the 
tr uth- motive and the value-motive . The one is tributary to 
the other, and neither . i s corr. plete or adequate without the 
othe r:. 
Pragmatism has be en described as a philosophy which p uts 
the bur den on the practical and vaiue side. ~ have a ri g ht, 
indeed, to give a lar ge place in the development of our 
knowledge of religion to the pragmatic principle . Profe ssor 
Orman~ would a gree with Boffding .in making a real test of 
relig ious .conceptions, teacbi ngs and .instit utions to depend 
upon the creation and aon$ ervation of values. The r el i g ious 
consciousness has .in . itself tbe sense of transcendence .which 
.cre a te s as well as conserves values. 
Among the original and a priori elements of the huma n 
personal ity a r e the prima ry i nstincts which reach out after 
God, fr eed om and immortality . In the most univer s~ l 
developement of c onscio u sness these take on the fo r m of root-
.concepts . i n a ll natural as well as in revea l ed rel~g ian. 
Since these con c epts rcot back in the a priori and i nst inctive 
lif e it follows that no abstract demonstra tion i s possible 
in refere nc e to an y of them • For example, there seems to .be 
. univer sa l . il1 man an insti nc tive r eaching out after i mm ortality, . 
Human .belief . in i mm ort a lity .doss not rest on . any . so~called "proofs~ . 
Considerations which .determine humanity . a t this ~ oint . come fro. m 
the .s ide of value rather than fro m the theore~ic . side . 
• 
• 
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Su:cely then , ·and .· la stlJ", :it .behooves ·a11 who love tr.uth, 
and who ·seek to .conserve truth~values, to .appeal ·from .all 
sense .empi:cicisms, .upon ·the one ·band, or so...;ca1led >logical 
demonstrations, :upon ·the other; , ·to ·this higher p:cagmatic 
test of · tnuth~evaluation . in ~eligion • He:ce±n .we .discover the 
. unique ·ve.lue of President ·McConnell's .book, "Religious Certainty'~ . 
Its significance -lies .in the scope of . suggestion .and , olear.ness 
of ;illtistration :witb .whioh ·the author : shows the :application 
of ·the p:cinciples of the ·t.:cue ·higher pragme;tism , which, 
·as we :conceive .it, is .at once .both .rational and pragmatic, 
. in locatin~ the t r.ue grounds of .certeinty . in all matters of 
religious ·life, knowledge and faith. And .it is my, firm conviction 
that the present generation can -learn no more .important 
.lesson than this of the application of the rational and 
practical principles of t he higher pragmatism to the determinat ion 
of truth-Values , both for the individual and for societ~, 
and none the ·le ss for ·locating the tnue grounds of certainty 
. in politics and ethics than .in religion • 
• 
• 
• 
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